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Introduction 
On August 25, 2012, a little known gelding
1
 named Willy Beamin won the highly 
prestigious Kings Bishop Stakes at the famous Saratoga Racecourse.
2
 Receiving lukewarm 
support, the eleven-to-one shot had just won his second race in four days, a rare feat in modern 
horseracing.
3
 Notably absent from the winner’s circle was the gelding’s trainer, Rick Dutrow.4 
Instead of hoisting the trophy, Dutrow watched the celebrations from a Chinese restaurant in 
Greenvale, New York.
5
 At the time of the race, Dutrow had accrued seventy violations 
throughout fifteen racetracks in nine states over the course of his career.
6
 Most recently, Dutrow 
was issued a ten year ban from racing horses in New York after hypodermic needles were found 
in his barn and one of his horses tested positive for a powerful painkilling drug.
7
 Dutrow was 
only allowed to continue training in New York after a lower court granted a stay of his 
suspension while he appealed.
8
 One year prior, Dutrow was also banned from running horses in 
                                                            
1 A Gelding is a castrated male horse Gelding Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/gelding  (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
2 Jack Shinar, Willy Beamin Shoots to King’s Bishop Surprise, BLOODHORSE, (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/72342/willy-beamin-shoots-to-kings-bishop-surprise. 
3 Id. 
4 Joe Drape, Shadows and Victories Follow Trainer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/sports/trainer-richard-dutrow-keeps-winning-even-after-suspension.html. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 Jerry Bossert, Rick Dutrow Jr. unfazed as he sets out to appeal 10-year suspension at the Court of Appelas, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (July 21, 2012), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-07-21/news/32768159_1_train-horses-
butorphanol-rick-dutrow. 
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Kentucky after he was denied a racing license.
9
 Considering Dutrow’s scandalous reputation, it 
is no surprise that he rarely attends races at Saratoga, choosing instead to “stay out of the public 
eye.”10 Unfortunately, horseracing cannot hide the fact that its current regulatory structure allows 
trainers to compete and win in some states, despite being banned from racing in others. 
One of the primary reasons for trainer suspensions is the use of performance enhancing 
drugs. In 2009, only one of the top ten trainers by earnings did not have a prior drug related 
suspension.
11
 However, these trainers’ businesses suffered little while they were suspended. This 
is because each suspended trainer’s stable of horses is allowed to compete under the name of the 
suspended trainer’s assistant.12 Cristophe Clement, a highly successful trainer stated that, “ten 
years ago, you were embarrassed to get a medication suspension…now trainers get suspended 
and go away, and when they come back they get more horses and more owners than they had 
before they left.”13 If the horseracing industry continues to allow trainers to circumvent their 
suspensions through this practice, then the performance enhancing drugs issue will never be 
resolved.  
This article will address the issue of performance enhancing drug use in the sport of 
horseracing. Specifically, it will consider the current fragmented regulatory scheme which allows 
each individual state to regulate itself, and contemplate the possibility of a federal regulation as 
                                                            
9 Drape, supra note 4 (Dutrow’s license was denied for “misrepresentations on his application” and “conduct against 
the best interest of racing.”). 
10 Id. 
11 Joe Drape, Barred for Drugs, Horse Trainers Return to Track, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/sports/05horses.html?_r=1 
12 Id. In 2006, trainer Steve “Asmussen was suspended by Louisiana authorities when a filly he trained tested 750 
times over the legal limit for the local anesthetic mepivacaine, which can deaden pain in a horse’s legs, he turned his 
horses over to Scott Blasi, his longtime assistant. Blasi won 198 races in 2006 as the Asmussen stable finished the 
year with more than $14 million in earnings.” 
13 Id. After serving his 2006 suspension, Asmussen was given two highly prominent horses to train. The first was 
two time Horse of the Year, Curlin, who won the Preakness in 2007. Asmussen was also given Rachel Alexandra, 
who had an undefeated season winning the Preakness, Woodward, and Haskell in 2009.  
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an alternative. In doing so, this article will highlight the inadequacy of disciplinary measures for 
the sport’s trainers. Under the current regime, recidivism is tolerated and reciprocity is not 
always enforced. Part I will discuss current regulation of performance enhancing drugs in 
horseracing and how it fosters trainer misconduct. Part II will analyze proposed and current state 
regulations and consider their ability to more effectively discipline trainers nationally. Finally, 
Part III will argue for a stand-alone federal regulation that ensures medication uniformity, 
reciprocity, and a more stringent disciplinary system for repeat offenders and trainers who are 
suspended.  
I.  Current Regulation of Performance Enhancing Drugs and how the System Fosters 
Trainer Misconduct 
A. Current Regulatory Format 
American horseracing dates back to the sixteenth century and the settlement of the 
English colonies.
14
 The sport emerged as a popular recreational activity that occurred in both 
rural open pastures and major city streets.
15
 By the late seventeenth century, the sport began to 
become more organized when official race courses were created in New York and Virginia.
16
 As 
racing’s popularity grew, participants sought to breed horses that were stronger and faster.17 This 
increased popularity was the impetus for importation of the Thoroughbred from England in 
1730.
18
  
                                                            
14 JOAN S. HOWLAND & MICHAEL J. HANNON, A LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE TO AMERICAN THOROUGHBRED RACING 
LAW FOR SCHOLARS, PRACTITIONERS AND PARTICIPANTS 1 (William S. Hein & Co. 1998).  
15 Id. (so many races occurred on Sassafras Street in Philadelphia that it became known as “Race Street.”). 
16 Id. at 2. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
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The Thoroughbred’s lineage originated more than three hundred years ago from three 
“foundation stallions – the Darley Arabian, the Godolphin Arabian and the Byerly Turk.”19 
These three stallions were bred to physically stronger, but slower mares that were native to 
England.
20
 A new breed of horse resulted from these pairings that could support weight and 
maintain speed over long distances.
21
 This was due in large part to the progeny’s physical 
makeup. In terms of structure, the Thoroughbred’s legs are “clean and long” consisting of strong 
bones, muscles and tendons.
22
 While the horse is running, its rear legs “act as springs [when] 
they bend and straighten,” propelling the horse forward.23 The front legs then continue this 
motion as they help pull the horse forward.
24
 Thoroughbreds also have a long neck which moves 
in rhythm with their legs.
25
 This rhythm helps extend the stride fully, allowing the horse to reach 
and sustain speeds surpassing forty miles per hour.
26
 Combined, all of these characteristics made 
the Thoroughbred the perfect breed of horse for racing.
27
 Therefore, by the 1750s, Thoroughbred 
racing was organized to only allow “pedigreed horses” to participate.28  
Thoroughbred racing in America began during the late seventeenth century and grew in 
popularity from that time forward.
29
 By 1860, racing was legalized in almost every state and 
racetracks were being built throughout the country.
30
 However, by 1890, racetracks became a 
place of corruption and dishonesty. Trainers and jockeys were accused of cheating while illegal 
                                                            
19 The Jockey Club et al., Thoroughly Thoroughbred, An Informational Guide to the Thoroughbred Industry, 3 
(2006), http://www.jockeyclub.com/pdfs/thoroughly_thoroughbred.pdf. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id.   
24 Id.  
25 Jockey Club, supra note 19. 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Howland & Hannon, supra note 14. 
29 Id. at 1-2.  
30 Id. at 3 
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bookmaking was rampant.
31
 Distrust of the horseracing industry was so prevalent that “between 
1897 and 1908 the number of racetracks in the United States decreased from 314 to a mere 25.”32  
By 1930, the public’s distrust towards the horseracing industry began to revert. During 
this time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt oversaw a growth in regulatory agencies that led to an 
increase in the allocation of power to state governments.
33
 Seeing a need to safeguard the 
horseracing industry, states adopted rules to protect the “trainers, jockeys, owners, spectators, 
and the horses themselves.”34 In order to make these rules, state racing commissions were 
formed.
35
 These commissions, charged with protecting the integrity and fairness of the sport, 
adopted local rules to be followed by participants in their jurisdiction.
36
 This resulted in a 
fragmented governing structure as each state abided by its own rules.
37
  
The fragmented nature of the sport was furthered when the New York Court of Appeals 
reached a decision in Fink v. Cole
38
 making it “unconstitutional for state government to delegate 
licensing power to any private organization.”39 This decision substantially diminished the 
authority retained by any private racing authority and gave even more power to the state racing 
commissions.
40
 Each racing commission then became responsible for issuing licenses to its 
                                                            
31 Id. at 7 
32 Id.  
33 Alexander M. Waldrop, Jarl M. Nobert & John W. Polonis, Horse Racing Regulatory Reform Through 
Constructive Engagement by Industry Stakeholders with State Regulators, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 389, 393 (2012). 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Fink v. Cole, 97 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1951). 
39 Howland & Hannon, supra note 14 at 10 – 11.  
40 Id.  
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participants; implementing rules that govern the sport; enforcing these rules; and administering 
penalties for any rules violation.
41
  
In 1978, Congress exerted some federal control over the industry when it passed the 
Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (IHA).
42
 This legislation granted the Federal Government 
authority to regulate “interstate off track-wagering on horseraces.”43 This legislation was drafted 
to ensure cooperation among those states that participate in off track wagering; however, it did 
nothing to impose any strictures on the way in which the sport was regulated internally.
44
 Today, 
the United States horseracing industry remains decentralized and each of its 38 racing 
jurisdictions continues to maintain individual authority to regulate the sport as it deems fit.
45
  
While state racing commissions maintain legal regulatory control of the horseracing 
industry, the Jockey Club serves as a private organization with some influence. The Jockey Club 
was founded in 1894 in order to preserve the integrity of the Thoroughbred breed of horses.
46
 
Prior to Fink v. Cole, the Jockey Club was the regulatory agency that governed racing.
47
 
However, today the organization serves as the breed registry.
48
 Essentially, the Jockey Club 
                                                            
41 Waldrop, supra note 33, at 392. 
42 Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (1978) (“Congress finds that – the States should have the 
primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders; the 
Federal Government should prevent interference by one State with the gambling policies of another and should act 
to protect identifiable national interests…”). 
43 Id; An “off track wager” is one that is made and accepted at one state’s betting facility, on a race that is being run 
in another state Interstate Horseracing Act: Hearing on S.1185 Before the Comm. On Commerce, Science, & 
Transportation, 94th Cong. 1 (1977) (statement of Sen. Wendell H. Ford) (This regulation was made due to the state 
racing commission’s fear that these off track wagering facilities would cause attendance at their racetracks to drop). 
44 Id.  
45 Waldrop, supra note 33 at 392-93. 
46 Medication and Performance Enhancing Drugs in Horse Racing: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 112th Cong. 26 (2012) [hereinafter Medication Hearings] (statement of 
James Gagliano. President and C.E.O of the Jockey Club), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg76248/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76248.pdf. 
47 Howland & Hannon, supra note 14 at 6.  
48 About the Registry, THE JOCKEY CLUB, http://www.jockeyclub.com/registry.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).  
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ensures that each foal is a descendant of a registered male and female Thoroughbred.
49
 Beyond 
this responsibility, the Jockey Club has also extended substantial resources and convened 
conferences in order to protect the integrity, safety and welfare of the sport.
50
 Most recently, the 
Jockey Club has concerned itself with the growing problem of performance enhancing drugs.
51
 
Specifically, the organization has funded a drug detection system, studied the use of drugs in the 
industry and issued rules recommendations to state racing commissions on how to test for and 
regulate the use of drugs.
52
 While these initiatives can be helpful, the organization has no actual 
authority to enforce them.
53
 Thus, the Jockey Club uniformly regulates the breed of horses that 
participate in the sport, but has no actual authority to enact regulation governing the sport itself.  
B. The Problem with the Current Regulatory Format 
Because each of the thirty eight racing jurisdictions operates separately, they are 
inherently in competition with one another.
54
 Specifically, each racing jurisdiction wants owners 
and trainers to run their horses at its racetracks.
55
 When a racetrack features races with more 
horses in them, this typically leads to an increase in the handle.
56
 Any increase in handle leads to 
an increase in tax revenue generated for the state.
57
 Ultimately, this incentivizes state racing 
                                                            
49 Id.  
50 Id.; Round Table Conference, THE JOCKEY CLUB, http://www.jockeyclub.com/ROUNDTABLE.asp (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2013).  
51 See generally Medication Hearings, supra note 46 at 24.  
52 Id.   
53 Howland & Hannon, supra note 14 at 10-11.  
54 Waldrop, supra note 33 at 397. 
55 Id.  
56 Mac McBride, Record Purses, Big Fields, Handle Increases Highlight 2012 Del Mar Meeting, DEL MAR 
THOROUGHBRED CLUB, (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.dmtc.com/upload/2012eosrelease_updated.pdf; Handle 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/handle (last visited Jan. 26, 
2013) (Definition of handle: the total amount bet on a race, game or event).  
57 Gale Encyclopedia of US History: Horse Racing and Showing, ANSWERS.COM,  
http://www.answers.com/topic/horse-racing-and-showing. (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
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commissions to implement more lenient regulations in order to attract more horses.
58
  Prominent 
racehorse owner and CEO of Team Valor International, Barry Irwin,
59
 characterized the situation 
when he testified before Congress. Irwin said that “states are in competition with other states. 
Racetracks are in direct competition with racetracks in other states for top horses. So trainers 
play states against one another, lobbying for more lax drug rules. States that appease trainers get 
the horses, the other states don’t.”60 This ultimately leads to a system that is disjointed, lacking 
control and accountability.
61
 Without uniformity the system will continue to under-enforce its 
regulations and the problems that face the industry will persist.  
C. The Problem of the Regulation of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Horseracing 
Unlike Europe and the majority of the rest of the world, the United States allows horses 
to run on race-day medications. Specifically, horses are permitted to compete while using 
furosemide (Lasix), a drug that is believed to prevent exercise-induced pulmonary hemorrhaging 
of the lungs and phenylbutazone (Bute), an anti-inflammatory.
62
 While Lasix and Bute are 
permitted on race-day, hundreds of other drugs are not.
63
 Jurisdictions draw distinctions between 
various drugs and the performance enhancing effect that they have on the horse.
64
 Those drugs 
that have a primarily therapeutic effect receive a lower classification, and thereby a less serious 
                                                            
58 Medication Hearings, supra note 46 at 5 (statement of Barry Irwin, C.E.O of Team Valor Int’l).   
59 The Team, TEAMVALOR.COM, http://www.teamvalor.com/team.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).  
60 Medication Hearings supra note 46 at 5. 
61 William Rhoden, Uncontrolled Sport May Not Merit Triple Crown Glory, N.Y. TIMES, (May 27, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/sports/horse-racing-may-not-deserve-triple-crown-
glory.html?adxnnl=1&ref=tomudall&adxnnlx=1348668021-SC+dh6BGh1iHRC+S0VKgUw. 
62 Kimberli Gasparon, Comment, The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering Performance-
Enhancing Drugs to Racehorses, 16 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 199, 206 (2009); Joe Drape, A Promise to Avoid Race-
Day Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/sports/court-upholds-10-year-ban-for-
horse-trainer-dutrow.html. 
63 Id., at 206. 
64 Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances and Recommended Penalties and Model Rule, 
ASSOCIATION OF RACING COMMISSIONERS INT’L, Inc., iv-vii (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter Guidelines], 
http://www.arci.com/druglisting.pdf.  
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punishment.
65
 Those drugs that have a primarily performance enhancing effect receive a higher 
classification and a higher level of punishment.
66
 For example, drugs that possess stimulant or 
depressant qualities or affect the nervous or neuromuscular system tend to have a high potential 
performance enhancing effect.
67
 Such drugs “mask a horse’s nervous system so that it can run 
harder and feel little pain.” 68 This creates a great danger to the horse and jockey. The horse will 
not recognize the physiological warnings that its body is trying to send and the potential for a 
catastrophic injury is greatly exacerbated.
69
  If the horse does breakdown, then the jockey is 
likely to fall off the horse and suffer injury.
70
 A positive test for one of these drugs has the 
potential for a suspension of at least fifteen days, and in some cases multiple years.
71
  
Drugs that have a therapeutic effect with a limited potential performance enhancing effect 
such as diuretics, antihistamines and skeletal muscle relaxants receive lesser punishment.
72
 This 
is because these drugs are administered “to treat injuries and infirmities” and are generally 
considered “necessary to keep a horse healthy.”73 A violation connected to the use of such 
necessary therapeutic drugs might result in a monetary fine or written warning.
74
  
The classifications given to the various available drugs have been made by the 
Association of Racing Commissioners International (RCI). “RCI is a not-for profit trade 
                                                            
65 See generally id. at 38-40. 
 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at iv.  
68 Daniel Stone, Should Congress Police Horseracing?, The Daily Beast (Jul. 12, 2012, 9:50 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/12/should-congress-police-horseracing.html. 
69 Id.  
70 Jennie Rees, Jockey safety no sure bet, dangerous sport seeks improvements, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Apr. 24, 
2010), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20100426/SPORTS08/4260307/Jockey-safety-no-sure-bet-
dangerous-sport-seeks-improvements.  
71 Guidelines, supra note 64 at 38-9. 
72 Id. at iv.  
73 Medication Hearings, supra 46 note at 14. 
74 Guidelines, supra note 64 at 40. 
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association with no regulatory authority. Its members individually possess regulatory authority 
within their jurisdictions and solely determine whether to adopt RCI recommendations on 
policies and rules or not.”75 While many racing jurisdictions use the RCI’s model rules, 
jurisdictions maintain a right to use discretion and modify the rules in order to favor their 
particular circumstances.
76
  
In some instances, state racing commissions choose to allow certain therapeutic drugs to 
be administered at different time periods prior to a race. This form of regulation is called a 
“withdrawal time.”77 For example, in Pennsylvania the administration of a medication called 
clenbuterol is permitted no closer than forty eight hours prior to a race.
78
 In New York, 
clenbuterol cannot be administered within ninety six hours prior to a race.
79
 In comparison, 
trainers and owners would favor the regulation imposed by Pennsylvania. This is because it 
permits the horse to be trained on clenbuterol closer to the time of the race, allowing for a 
stronger residual effect from the drug.
80
  
 
 
                                                            
75 RACING COMMISSIONS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.arci.com/Racing_Commissioners_International/About.html 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2013). 
76 Waldrop, supra note 33 at 396. 
77  FERNANDA CAMARGO ET AL, EQUINE DRUGS, MEDICATION AND PERFORMANCE ALTERING SUBSTANCES: THEIR 
PERFORMANCE EFFECTS, DETECTION, AND REGULATION, (Oct 21, 2005), available at 
http://thomastobin.com/drugsmeds/drugsmeds.htm. 
78Administrative Policy Notice SHRC – 2008 – 02, Clenbuterol – Suggested Withdrawal Time Prior to Race Day 
(Sept. 24, 2008), 
http://www.agriculture.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_6_2_75292_10297_0_43/AgWebsite/Files/Pu
blications/Clenbuterol_Policy.pdf 
79 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4043.2 (2012). 
80 Clenbuterol is a drug used to treat respiratory diseases but it can also act as a muscle builder and stimulant. Some 
claim that it can improve a horses running time by one second. Additionally, horses can remain “muscled up for 
weeks afterward,” despite no longer being treated with the drug. Walt Bogdanich et al., Racing Economics Collide 
with Veterinarians Oath, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2012),  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/us/at-the-track-racing-
economics-collide-with-veterinarians-oath.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
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D. Enforcement of a trainer’s suspension 
 When a state racing commission suspends a trainer, it must have the ability to enforce 
that suspension. Dutrow’s recent ten year suspension from training horses in New York 
stipulates the following:  
Richard E. Dutrow, Jr. shall not directly or indirectly participate in 
New York pari-mutuel horse racing, he is denied the privileges and 
use of the grounds of all racetracks, and he is forbidden to 
participate in any share of purses or other payment. Every horse is 
denied the privileges of the grounds and shall not participate in 
pari-mutuel racing in New York, further, that is (a) owned or 
trained by him, or any individual who serves as his agent or 
employee, during his revocation or (b) for which he, during his 
revocation, is involved, directly or indirectly, with its training, 
including by not limited to any arrangements made to care for, 
train, enter, race, invoice, collect fees or payments, manage funds, 
employ or insure workers, provide advice or information, or 
otherwise assist with any aspect of the training of the horse.
81
 
However, Dutrow has openly admitted to violating the terms of his previous suspensions.
82
  For 
example, “In 2005, while serving a sixty day suspension for racing a horse under the name of an 
owner who did not actually own the horse, Dutrow ran another horse, St. Liam, in a Kentucky 
race under the name of [trainer] Bobby Frankel.”83 Also during this suspension, Dutrow 
continued to train another horse, Wild Desert.
84
 “Because [Dutrow] had been advised by the New 
York Racing Secretary that Wild Desert would not be allowed on the grounds at Aqueduct 
Racetrack, where Dutrow trains his horses, Dutrow brought Wild Desert into the gate at 
                                                            
81 Rulings: Richard E. Dutrow Jr., NEW YORK STATE GAMING COMMISSION (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://rulings.racing.ny.gov/searchrulings.detail.php?ID=30726. 
82 Ray Paulick, Hearing Officer: Dutrow Acts ‘Corrupt Even in the Olden Days of the Wile West,’ PAULICK 
REPORT (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.paulickreport.com/news/ray-s-paddock/hearing-officer-dutrow-acts-corrupt-
even-in-the-olden-days-of-the-wild-west/. 
83 Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order, Dutrow v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission 
http://blogs.courier-journal.com/horsebiz/files/2013/02/Dutrow-ruling1.pdf. 
84 Id.  
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Aqueduct under a false name.”85 Dutrow then “fabricated a workout for Wild Desert at 
Monmouth Park Racetrack in New Jersey, although the horse was not at Monmouth and did not 
train there.”86 After establishing the fake workout, Dutrow then shipped Wild Desert to Canada 
in order to run in the Queen’s Plate87 “under the name of Bobby Frankel.”88 Throughout the time 
of his suspension, Dutrow billed the owners of St. Liam and Wild Desert for training costs and 
also received his share of each horse’s winnings.89 Dutrow’s actions show that trainers will 
sometimes be able to train their horses while they are suspended. Therefore, racing commissions 
must implement policies and procedures that prevent trainers from doing so.   
E. The Problem of the Lack of Reciprocity 
 Reciprocity is “a mutual exchange of privileges, specifically, a recognition by one of two 
countries or institutions of the validity of licenses or privileges granted by the other.”90 One 
particular problem facing the regulation of drugs in horseracing is that not every jurisdiction 
reciprocally enforces the suspensions or license denials imposed on violating trainers by other 
states. Recall Dutrow’s denial of a trainer’s license in the State of Kentucky during April 2011.91 
The Kentucky Horse Racing Commission (KHRC) denied the license after it found that Dutrow 
“ha[d] shown a consistent disregard for the rules of racing.”92 Under the cited regulation, the 
KHRC had the power to deny a license when it would be in the public’s best interest, where the 
                                                            
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 The Queen’s Plate is “the first jewel in Canada’s Triple Crown of Thoroughbred Racing and the longest 
continuously run stakes race in North America” 2013 Queen’s Plate – Event Details, WOODBINE ENTERTAINMENT, 
http://www.woodbineentertainment.com/Queensplate/Pages/EventDetails.aspx. 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Reciprocity Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reciprocity (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
91 Frank Angst, Trainer Dutrow Denied Racing License, THOROUGHBRED TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-news/2011/04/13/trainer-dutrow-denied-racing-license.aspx 
92 Id.  
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trainer fraudulently falsified application documents or where the trainer was previously 
suspended in Kentucky or other racing jurisdictions.
93
 At the time of his application, Dutrow had 
amassed nearly seventy prior violations and was in the process of appealing a suspension issued 
in New York.
94
 Ultimately, the KHRC reviewed Dutrow’s long history of prior indiscretions and 
deemed him unfit to receive a Kentucky racing license. 
After Dutrow was denied a trainer’s license in Kentucky, his barn continued to flourish. 
In 2012, Dutrow competed in 520 races, winning 131 times and totaling earnings of 
$7,232,708.
95
  Additionally, Dutrow “was the leading trainer at the Belmont spring/summer 
meet”96 and also earned $1,023,609 in purse money at prestigious Saratoga Racecourse.97 Aside 
from New York, Dutrow has also started horses in other states such as Florida and 
Pennsylvania.
98
 Certainly, Kentucky’s denial of a trainer’s license did not impact Dutrow’s 
ability to win elsewhere.  
In order to understand why Dutrow was not precluded from running elsewhere, one must 
first look at the types of regulations drafted by each state racing commission. In New York for 
example, “the board may refuse to issue or revoke a license if it shall find that the applicant…has 
                                                            
93 Id.  
94 Drape, supra note 4. 
95  Trainer Profile Page Richard E. Dutrow, Jr., EQUIBASE.COM, 
http://www.equibase.com/profiles/Results.cfm?type=People&searchType=T&eID=110865 (last visited Jan. 18, 
2013).  
96 Jenny Kellner, Dominguez, Dutrow, Ramseys win Belmot Meet Titles, N.Y. RACING ASSOC. (July 15, 2012), 
http://www.nyra.com/belmont/dominguez-dutrow-ramseys-win-belmont-meet-titles/ 
97 Leading Trainers at Saratoga, EQUIBASE.COM, 
http://www.equibase.com/premium/eqbTopLeadersByTrackDisplay.cfm?TRK=SAR&CY=USA&STAT=T&STYL
S=SAR (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
98 See generally Tom LaMarra, Redeemed Posts Record Greenwood Cup Victory, BLOODHORSE (JULY 17, 2012), 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/71255/redeemed-posts-record-greenwood-cup-victory; Blood-
Horse Staff,  Boys at Tosconova Takes Gulfstream Allowance, BLOODHORSE ( Jan. 31 2012), 
https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/67191/boys-at-tosconova-takes-gulfstream-allowance; David 
Grening, Rick Dutrow Looking at Busy Week with Preakness Longshot, Court Date, THE DAILY RACING FORM (May 
17, 2012), http://www.drf.com/news/rick-dutrow-looking-busy-week-preakness-longshot-court-date. 
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violated or attempted to violate any law with respect to racing in any jurisdiction…”99 Under this 
regulation, New York is not bound by the suspensions or license denials made by other racing 
jurisdictions. Rather, the racing commission is afforded discretion as it may, not must refuse a 
license when another jurisdiction has done so.
100
 Other prominent states that allow the use of 
discretion include Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Florida. 
101
 Ultimately, it is this discretion that 
has allowed Dutrow to race elsewhere despite being denied a license in Kentucky.  
While many states afford their racing commission’s discretion in enforcing other state’s 
disciplinary measures, there are some states that mandate reciprocity. For instance, New Jersey’s 
regulation stipulates that “full force and effect shall be given to the denial, revocation or 
suspension of any license by any other racing commission or turf governing body.”102 Similarly, 
Ohio mandates that: 
If a person or horse is suspended, expelled, ruled off, or otherwise 
ineligible, or if a person’s license is revoked, or application for a 
license has been denied or if a person or horse us under any other 
current penalty pursuant to the rules of a racing authority of any 
other state or country, such person and/or horse shall stand 
suspended, expelled, ruled off or denied a license at all tracks 
operating under permit from the Ohio state racing commission 
until the ruling be withdrawn by the originating authority.
103
  
In both of these regulations, the state’s racing commissions are afforded no discretion 
whatsoever. Both Ohio and New Jersey are obligated to enforce other racing commission’s 
licensing denials or suspensions.  
                                                            
99 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4002.9. 
100 Id. 
101 58 PA. CODE § 165.35; 810; KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:025; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61D-2.021 (silent on other 
jurisdictions). 
102 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:70-1.29 (1982).  
103 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3769-7-43 (2012).  
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In practice, the discretionary regulations have allowed Mr. Dutrow to compete in New 
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Florida while the mandatory regulations have precluded him 
from running in New Jersey and Ohio.
104
 Certainly, deterrence and the sport’s integrity are 
compromised when a trainer is permitted to compete and win races in another venue while they 
are suspended or denied licenses elsewhere. Onlookers perceive that state racing commissions 
inadequately enforce prohibitions on the use of performance enhancing drugs.  
F. The Problem of Trainers giving their horses to their assistants while they are suspended. 
When a trainer is ultimately suspended, the disciplinary effect of this suspension is 
minimized as the suspended trainer is often permitted to give his or her horses to their assistant 
trainer.
105
 On September 22, 2012, a colt named Handsome Mike won the $1 million 
Pennsylvania Derby for listed trainer Leandro Mora.
106
 Handsome Mike had previously raced for 
trainer Doug O’Neill.107 However, O’Neill was serving a forty five day suspension imposed on 
him by the California Horse Racing Board for “elevated carbon-dioxide levels” in the blood of 
one his horses.
108
 It is believed that this is a result of a procedure known as “milkshaking,” 
whereby a “bicarbonate of soda, sugar and electrolytes” is fed to a horse through a tube.109 This 
prohibited practice is believed to negate the buildup of lactic acid and prevent fatigue.
110
 Despite 
serving the suspension for this infraction, O’Neill was permitted to assign Handsome Mike and 
                                                            
104 Grening, supra note 98. 
105 Drape, supra note 11. 
106 Claire Novak, Handsome Mike Wins Pennsylvania Derby, BLOODHORSE (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/72999/handsome-mike-wins-pennsylvania-derby. 
107 Id.  
108 Associated Press, Doug O’Neill not the only trainer with history of drugging horses, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 
8, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/20120608/belmont-stakes-trainers-drugs/. 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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the other horses in his barn to his assistant Mora.
111
 When asked about his suspension and Mora 
assuming his position, O’Neill said that “Leandro will keep it as consistent and smooth sailing as 
possible.”112 While stepping in for O’Neill, Mora did just that. Mora entered horses in eighty 
nine races, winning fifteen and accumulating $1,332,137 in purse money.
113
 Ultimately, state 
racing commissions issue licensing suspensions as one of its most heavy handed disciplinary 
measures. When a suspended trainer’s operation is able to uninterruptedly persist, the 
disciplinary effect of this measure is diminished and onlookers perceive the punishment as 
nothing but a farce.  
II.  Proposed and Current Regulation of Horseracing that could be applied nationally. 
A. Interstate Horseracing Improvement Act of 2011. 
 Currently, the IHA stipulates that the Federal Government only has the ability to regulate 
inter-state wagering.
114
 However, in 2011, Senator Tom Udall put forth an amendment to the 
IHA that would provide Federal oversight to the entire industry.
115
 This Amendment is called the 
Interstate Horseracing Improvement Act of 2011(IHIA).
116
 The IHIA calls for a uniform ban on 
all race-day medications, implements a “three strikes and you’re out penalty” for all participants 
and “requires drug testing of race horses by independent, accredited labs.”117 Ultimately, the 
IHIA would leave the enforcement of performance enhancing drugs to state racing 
                                                            
111 Ron Mitchell, Doug O’Neill to Serve Suspension, ESPN (July 11, 2012), http://espn.go.com/horse-
racing/story/_/id/8157510/doug-oneill-serve-suspension. 
112 Id.  
113 Trainer Profile Page Leandro Mora, EQUIBASE.COM, 
http://equibase.com/profiles/Results.cfm?type=People&searchType=T&eID=1290 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
114 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (1978). 
115 Tom LaMarra, Federal Regulation Gets Push with Caveats, BLOODHORSE  (July 13, 2012), 
http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/71210/federal-regulation-gets-push-with-caveats 
116 Interstate Horseracing Improvement Act 2011, H.R. 1733, 112th Cong. (2011) available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.886:. 
117 Fact vs. Fiction: Ending Race Horse Doping, TOMUDALL.SENATE.GOV, (April 5, 2012) 
http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1051.  
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commissions.
118
  The IHIA would then allow for the Federal Trade Commission to shut down 
off-track wagering in states that do not adequately enforce the regulation.
119
 Today, the IHIA has 
not been up for vote and has been referred to committee.
120
 The IHIA must therefore be 
reintroduced in order for it to have any possibility of enactment.  
 Despite the stalled status of the IHIA, an analysis of its goals and how it achieves them 
can provide helpful insight into the remedial needs of the industry. Primarily, the IHIA provides 
uniformity through its blanket prohibition on the use of performance enhancing drugs.
121
  The 
legislation then defines a performance enhancing drug as “any substance capable of affecting the 
performance of a horse at any time…” including those drugs listed by the RCI “Uniform 
Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances.”122 The regulation also mandates that each 
state’s disciplinary measures be reciprocally enforced.123 Concerning discipline, the proposed bill 
states that “a person that provides a horse with a performance-enhancing drug…shall be 
…suspended for a period of not less than 180 days from all activities relating to any horserace 
that is the subject of an interstate off-track wager.”124 Therefore, this suspension would apply in 
all states that allow interstate wagering and cure the ill that allows trainers suspended in one 
jurisdiction to compete in another. Lastly, this proposed bill’s punitive measures are far more 
stringent than those that currently exist. Under the bill, a first time offender would receive a 180 
day suspension and $5000 fine; a second time offender would receive at least a 1 year suspension 
and $20,000 fine; and a third time offender would be permanently banned from horseracing and 
                                                            
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 GOVTRACK.US, H.R. 1733 (112TH): INTERSTATE HORSERACING IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2011, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1733 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).  
121 Supra note 116 at § 9(b). 
122 Id. §9(a)(2)(A-B). 
123 Id. § (d)(1)(A)(ii). 
124 Id.  
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subject to a $50,000 fine.
125
 Certainly these measures pose a significant threat to the trainer if 
they are violated.  
B. Jockey Club Reformed Racing Medication Rules 
 Similar to the IHIA, the Jockey Club has also put forth its own reformed rules that 
address the problem of performance enhancing drugs in horseracing. These rules were 
formulated by the Jockey Club after it commissioned a study of the sport in 2001.
126
 This study 
determined that “animal safety, welfare and medication” were the major factors that were 
contributing to the sport’s overall public decline in popularity.127 The Jockey Club’s Reformed 
Racing Medication Rules were thereby announced in 2012 “in order to clean up racing” and 
restore popularity.
128
 Concerning implementation, the Jockey Club does not have regulatory 
authority to implement the rules themselves, but has advocated strongly that these rules be 
adopted by the state racing commissions and other industry agencies.
129
 Under this model, 
uniformity could only be achieved if every state racing commission adopts the Jockey Club’s 
rules.  
 Among its goals, the rules put forth a uniform medication policy,
130
 ensure a system of 
reciprocity, prevent suspended trainers from giving their horses to their assistant, implement 
policies that allow suspensions to be enforced and more stringently punish recidivists.
 131
  The 
proposed rules accomplish uniformity through implementation of a list of prohibited substances 
                                                            
125 Id. § (d)(A)(i-iii). 
126 Medication Hearings supra note 46 at 24. 
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 REFORMED RACING MEDICATION RULES at 3 (August 12, 2012) available at 
http://www.jockeyclub.com/pdfs/reformed_rules.pdf. 
131 Id. at 4. 
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and allowable limits of “controlled therapeutic medications.”132 Each state would no longer have 
discretion to manipulate withdrawal times or allow higher levels of certain therapeutic drugs on 
race day. Next, the rules ensure reciprocity through language which states that: “all racing 
regulatory authorities shall mutually and reciprocally enforce all points and penalties assessed 
against trainers…”133 Therefore, any state racing commission’s disciplinary measure would be 
reciprocally enforced in another jurisdiction. Furthermore, the proposed rules state that “any 
penalty which includes suspension of 30 days or more shall require the transfer of all horses in 
training to unassociated persons subject to approval of the relevant regulatory authority.” 134 This 
would do away with the custom that allows trainers to give their horses to their assistants while 
they are suspended.  
 Concerning enforcement, the rules expand the racing commission’s jurisdiction to 
include “any location that conducts, records and/or submits official timed workout information 
under jurisdiction of the relevant racing regulatory authority.”135 This broader language would 
bring a vast number of training centers
136
 under each racing commission’s authority. Therefore, 
racing commissions would have the ability to look beyond the racetracks themselves and ensure 
that suspended trainers are not continuing to train their horses at an off-track training facility. 
Additionally, the rules propose that “racing associations should develop comprehensive training 
programs that enable backstretch security personnel to expand their knowledge and abilities in 
policing and securing the stable area.”137 These policing measures should be supported by the 
                                                            
132 Id. at 8-9. 
133 Id. at 11. 
134 Id. at 10. 
135 Id. at 4, 8.  
136 Official Training Centers, EQUIBASE.COM, http://www.equibase.com/tracks/training.cfm. 
137 Supra note 130 at 14. 
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Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau (TRPB)
138
 and the Organization of Racing Investigators 
(ORI); both of which serve as agencies that work to preserve the integrity of horseracing.
139
  
 Lastly, the Jockey Club’s Reformed rules more stringently punish recidivists through its 
use of a points system. This system has seven different levels, whereby, if a trainer accumulates 
a certain amount of points in a three year period, then he or she will be subject to that 
corresponding point value’s level of punishment.140 This helps impede recidivism as those who 
are repeat offenders will be treated more harshly than those non-prior offenders. Furthermore, 
recidivism would not be limited to one jurisdiction, but would instead apply in all prior offenses 
in any racing state. 
141
 
C. State Regulations 
 A number of states have implemented regulations that can better control the use of 
performance enhancing drugs in the industry. For instance, an Indiana regulation explicitly 
prohibits “a trainer suspended for more than fifteen days” from transferring his or her horses “to 
a spouse, member of the immediate family, assistant, employee, or household member of the 
                                                            
138 The TRPB is a “private investigative agency whose principal mission [is] to address issues of integrity and 
security in the Thoroughbred horseracing industry…TRPB continues to provide member tracks of the 
[Thoroughbred Racing Association (TRA)] with a wide variety of investigative, security, and analytic 
services…Upon request, TRPB supervises the security and policing operations at  TRA-member racetracks during 
their live race meeting. TRPB’s Information System, a repository which maintains, catalogues, and disseminates 
racing and wagering investigative, intelligence, and security information, is without parallel in the racing industry. 
Taken together, TRPB’s array of services creates an ongoing self-policing effort.” History, THOROUGHBRED RACING 
PROTECTIVE BUREAU, http://www.trpb.com/history.htm.  
139 Supra note 130 at 14; “ORI is a stand-alone Organization and is not affiliated with any Racing Industry 
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trainer.”142 This regulation ultimately would prevent the practice that allows trainers to give their 
horses to their assistants, thereby feeling no residual negative effects upon their return.  
Concerning enforcement, Texas maintains a regulation that allows its state racing 
commission to audit suspended trainers.
 143
  From an audit, the racing commission can prevent 
money from being funneled by the assistant to the suspended trainer. This promotes enforcement 
because the suspended trainer will not be allowed to benefit from the continued efforts of their 
assistant.  
D. Licensing Regulation in other fields.  
 Horseracing can also gain valuable insight into licensure regulation through the 
consideration of reciprocal discipline in other fields. When a lawyer is suspended in one 
jurisdiction, other jurisdictions where the lawyer is licensed will typically levy the same 
sanction.
144
 In order to reciprocally enforce another state’s disciplinary measures, a lawyer is 
required to give notice of their discipline to every state where that attorney is licensed.
145
 This 
then allows each of those jurisdictions to consider the appropriateness of reciprocal discipline.
146
 
In Massachusetts for example, another jurisdiction’s findings of misconduct “may be treated as 
establishing the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding.”147 The court will 
ultimately grant reciprocal enforcement of the other jurisdiction’s disciplinary measure: “unless 
(a) the procedure in the other jurisdiction did not provide reasonable notice or opportunity to be 
heard; (b) there was significant infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct; (c) imposition of 
                                                            
142 71 IND. ADMIN. CODE 10-2-8 (2012). 
143 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 311.104 (2012). 
144 LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 95 (Vicki Breen et. al. eds., 
3rd ed. 2012). 
145 Legal Ethics, Law. Deskbk. Prof. Resp. § 8.5-1 (2012-2013 ed). 
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the same discipline would result in grave injustice; or (d) the misconduct established does not 
justify the same discipline” in Massachusetts.148  
Ultimately, Massachusetts courts typically enforce other jurisdictions disciplinary 
measures.
149
 However, the four factor analysis ensures that reciprocal discipline is not unfair to 
the attorney.
150
 For example, it would be wholly unfair for an attorney to be reciprocally 
punished in State A for an offense that occurred in State B, when the offense that occurred in 
State B is not an offense in State A. Factor (d) of the analysis serves as a check on this potential 
problem. Aside from Massachusetts, other states like Wisconsin and North Dakota also employ a 
similar factored analysis that preserves fairness.
151
 Ultimately, the use of these factors favors 
reciprocal discipline but ensures the protection of attorneys from an unfair reciprocal disciplinary 
holding.  
Similar to attorneys, physicians can also have their license revoked for conduct that 
occurs in another jurisdiction. When a physician made willful misrepresentations on his license 
application to practice in Maryland, his application was denied by the Maryland State Board of 
Physicians.
152
 Prior to filing the Maryland application, the physician had been licensed to 
practice in New York.
153
 In response to the Maryland license denial, the New York State Board 
for Professional Medical Conduct levied a one year suspension pursuant to Education Laws § 
6530(9)(b) and § 6530(9)(d).
154
 Both laws mandate that New York punish conduct that occurred 
                                                            
148 Alan M. Colvin, Reciprocal Discipline: Double Jeopardy or A State's Right to Protect Its Citizens?, 25 J. Legal 
Prof. 143, 146 (2001). 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 144-45.  
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in another state, if that same conduct would have constituted misconduct in New York.
155
 
Ultimately, the physician’s willful misrepresentation on his license application would have 
constituted professional misconduct in New York. Under New York’s Education Law § 
6530(21), professional misconduct is established when a physician “willfully mak[es] or fil[es] a 
false report…”156 On Appeal, a New York Supreme Court concluded that the one year 
suspension was valid.
157
 First, the court reasoned that the physician received a proper hearing in 
Maryland.
158
 The physician received proper notice, a full evidentiary hearing, an opportunity to 
be heard, and representation by counsel.
159
 Second, the Court determined that the one year 
suspension was not arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by the record.
160
 Ultimately, this case 
demonstrates that a physician can have their license suspended in one state for the reasons 
associated with the denial of a license application in another state.  
Applying Dutrow’s violations to the regulation’s governing attorneys, it is fairly certain 
that his 2011 Kentucky license denial would have been reciprocally enforced. In regards to 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, Dutrow met with the licensing committee and was granted 
                                                            
155 Each of the following is professional misconduct and any licensee found guilty of such misconduct under the 
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an opportunity to speak on his behalf.
161
 Concerning proof of misconduct, Dutrow had been 
given a suspension in New York for possession of hypodermic needles and administering a 
power painkiller to one of his horses.
162
 Furthermore, Kentucky suspended Dutrow in 2008 and 
determined that he made misrepresentations on his 2011 license application.
163
 Regarding any 
potential “grave injustice” that reciprocal discipline would perpetuate, each state maintains the 
ability to reciprocally enforce the license denials imposed by other states.
164
 Therefore, the courts 
would be acting well within their power to discipline Dutrow for his Kentucky racing license 
denial. Lastly, Dutrow’s prior possession of a hypodermic needle and misrepresentations on his 
trainer’s application would have been punishable in Maryland; a state where Dutrow was 
permitted to compete in 2012.
165
 Accordingly, an application of these factors would have 
probably resulted in Dutrow’s reciprocal suspension by Maryland.  
Similarly, Dutrow’s 2011 Kentucky license denial would likely have resulted in a 
suspension under New York’s regulations governing physicians. The physician in Bursztyn was 
denied a Maryland physician’s license after he made willful misrepresentations on his 
application.
166
 Because this conduct also constituted misconduct in New York, the New York 
State Board of Professional Medical Conduct suspended the physician’s license for one year.167 
Like the physician in Bursztyn, Dutrow also made misrepresentations on his Kentucky license 
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application.
168
 Furthermore, Maryland – a state where Dutrow was previously licensed - 
prohibits making false or misleading statements to a racing official.
169
 However, unlike Bursztyn, 
Maryland did not levy any sort of sanction against Dutrow for his misrepresentation to the 
KHRC.
170
  
Taken together, an application of Dutrow’s violations to the regulations imposed on the 
medical and legal fields demonstrates that they should have been reciprocally disciplined. 
Additionally, both analyses highlight the extent to which the horseracing industry’s rules are 
inferior when compared to others.  
III.  Argument for a Federal Regulation of Horseracing 
A. Industry support for a Federal Regulation 
 In order for the horseracing industry to better regulate the use of performance enhancing 
drugs, the sport must have a uniform system of medication standards and maintain uniformity of 
enforcement and discipline. The best way to ensure this change is through the use of a federal 
regulation. While it has been argued that the industry would only accept federal regulation “as a 
last resort,”171 the racing community appears to have warmed up to the idea. Among its 
supporters are the Water Hay Oats Alliance (WHOA), “a grassroots organization that opposes 
use of medication on race day.”172 This group consists of prominent owners, Arthur and Staci 
Hancock, Gretchen and Roy Jackson, George Strawbridge, Barry Irwin, and Charlotte C. 
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Weber.
173
 Arthur Hancock accentuated the group’s support saying that “the time has come to 
accept the federal government’s offer to help us clean up our sport. We need to work with them, 
not against them, if we are serious.”174 Another prominent owner, Satish Sanan, also sees federal 
intervention an immediate way to cure the ills that face racing.
175
 Thus, it appears that industry 
leaders are recognizing the dire need for a remedy to the sport and now see federal regulation as 
a welcomed measure. 
B. Ways of Achieving a Federal Regulation 
 Ultimately, a federal regulation can be achieved through a stand-alone bill or an 
amendment to the IHA.
176
 Currently, the Jockey Club favors a stand-alone federal bill as 
opposed to amending the IHA. Jockey Club CEO, James Gagliano, stated the organization’s 
position citing fear that “the crucial medication issue could get lost should lawmakers decide to 
add other provisions” to the IHA.177 Ultimately, the Jockey Club would support a federal law 
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“with a comprehensive funding solution and a coordinated prosecution structure” modeled after 
its Reformed Racing Medication Rules.
178
  
Alternatively, an amendment to the IHA would create a uniform set of rules that govern 
every facet of the sport.
179
 If a state fails to enforce these uniform rules, the federal government 
would have the authority to then suspend wagering in that state.
180
 Principally, the difference 
between the two methods is its way of enforcement. While a stand-alone bill would establish its 
own enforcement and regulatory regime, an amendment of the IHA would use the threat of 
suspending interstate wagering as leverage to enact its regulations.  
C. Proposed Regulation 
 In order to draft an effective federal regulation, its drafters should focus on implementing 
uniform drug regulations, ensuring reciprocity, impeding recidivism, advancing enforcement and 
disallowing suspended trainers from giving their horses to their assistants.  The best way to bring 
about these goals is to consider the IHIA, Jockey Club Reformed Medication Rules, current state 
regulations and regulatory methods of other fields. 
1. Implement Uniform Drug Regulations 
 Regulatory drafters should look to the Jockey Club’s Reformed Racing Medication Rules 
so that a uniform drug policy can be achieved. These rules specifically layout which performance 
enhancing substances are prohibited and which therapeutic medications are permitted.
181
 
Furthermore, the Reformed Racing Medication Rules establish uniform withdrawal times for 
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each of the permitted therapeutic medications.
182
 In contrast, the IHIA prohibits the general use 
of performance enhancing drugs entirely.
183
 The IHIA broadly defines performance enhancing 
drugs to include “any substance capable of affecting the performance of a horse at any 
time…”184 Such general language could thereby preclude the use of valuable therapeutic drugs 
that assist the horse’s welfare and allow the horse to compete safely. Furthermore, such a broad 
definition does nothing to prevent confusion regarding which medications are prohibited. This 
confusion could cause trainers who believe they are administering legal medications to their 
horses to suffer penalties due to the imprecision of such a broad definition. Therefore, regulation 
drafters should use the Jockey Club’s Reformed Rules as their model due to its specificity and 
allowance of certain levels of therapeutic medications.   
2. Advance Enforcement   
 In order to prevent trainers from influencing the training of their hoses while they are 
suspended, legislators should adopt the Jockey Club’s Reformed Rules provision which expands 
a racing commission’s jurisdiction to include “any location that conducts, records and/or submits 
official timed workout information.”185 This language would broaden the racing commission’s 
jurisdiction to include many off-track facilities where a suspended trainer could train their horses 
in secrecy. Additionally, legislators should mandate uniform backstretch security protocols. All 
security personnel should undergo comprehensive training similar to that proposed in the Jockey 
Club’s Reformed Rules. Such procedures should allow security staff to investigate and better 
identify evidence of performance enhancing drugs at the track. Each racing commission’s 
security staff should also share information with every other racing commission, the TRPB and 
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ORI. This would create a uniform and comprehensive database that each racing commission 
could access in order to investigate performance enhancing drug use and uphold suspensions. 
Lastly, all legislators should look to the Texas legislation which allows its racing commission to 
audit suspended trainers.
186
 This provision advances enforcement because it would prevent 
suspended trainers from receiving proceeds from the continuation of their stable under the name 
of their assistant. Additionally, legislators should include a mandate for further punishment, 
including a fine and more suspension time, if this provision is violated. Together, these 
regulations would better enforce the use of performance enhancing drugs and trainer 
suspensions. 
3. Ensure Reciprocity 
 One major benefit to passing a federal legislation is that it would inherently allow for 
reciprocal enforcement. Because every trainer in every jurisdiction would have to abide by the 
same rules, each trainer’s violation, regardless of the state that it occurred, would intrinsically 
violate each of the other jurisdictions rules. Racing commissions would no longer have to 
consider whether the underlying offense would be an offense in its jurisdiction. Instead 
reciprocal discipline would flow logically across each and every racing jurisdiction. In order to 
ensure that states comply with this practice, the legislation should be drafted to mandate 
disclosure of a trainer’s violation to every racing jurisdiction, as is done in the reciprocal 
disciplinary process of lawyers. Once a violating trainer begins serving his or her suspension, 
every other state will be expected to provide similar force and effect to the underlying state’s 
suspension. Any state that receives disclosure but allows a suspended trainer to compete would 
then be subject to having their inter-state wagering suspended. Through the enactment of a 
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system that mandates reciprocity, trainers will not be permitted to avoid punishment by 
competing elsewhere and the integrity of the sport will ultimately be preserved.  
4. Impede Recidivism 
 To effectively impede recidivism, regulators should look to the structure proposed by the 
Jockey Club’s Reformed Racing Medication Rules. These rules establish a points system that 
takes all violations into account, regardless of jurisdiction.
187
 For each violation, there is an 
attached point value.
188
 Ultimately, the system calls for heavier punishments for those who 
accrue enough points to surpass the next threshold. For example, if a trainer commits enough 
violations to amass seventy five points, that trainer would be subject to a sixty day suspension.
189
 
If that same trainer accumulates an additional twenty five points, thereby graduating to the next 
level of punishment, then the suspension would be lengthened to 180 days.
190
 This system would 
effectively impede recidivism because each offense would not be viewed in a stand-alone 
fashion. Rather, every additional offense could lead to more serious punishment. As a result, 
trainers such as Dutrow, who amass a multitude of violations in their careers, will no longer be 
allowed to compete.  
     5. Disallow suspended trainers from giving their horses to their assistants 
  In order to effectively punish a suspended trainer, regulators must ensure that a trainer 
will not be permitted to give their horses to their assistant throughout the duration of their 
suspension. Regulators should therefore draft language similar to Indiana’s which prohibits “a 
trainer suspended for more than fifteen days” from transferring their horses “to a spouse, 
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member of the immediate family, assistant, employee, or household member of the trainer.”191 
Such language has also been included in the Jockey Club’s Reformed Racing Medication Rules 
for trainers suspended for more than 30 days.
192
 Ultimately it is essential that regulators draft 
language that does away with the practice as it does nothing but perpetuate a farce.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 Ultimately, horseracing will need uniform regulation of performance enhancing drugs in 
order to preserve the sport’s integrity. The best way to achieve this goal is to remove state 
discretion in drafting and enforcing medication regulations. The Federal Government must 
impose a set of standard medication rules that will be reciprocally followed and strictly enforced. 
In addition, trainers should not be permitted to give their horses to an assistant while they are 
serving a suspension. This allows trainers to avoid the negative consequences, such as losing 
their horses to another trainer, that a suspension is designed to impose. If the sport of horseracing 
imposes these regulations, it can begin a process of restoring integrity and fairness. 
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